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Gender and climate change:
Do female parliamentarians make difference?
ASTGHIK MAVISAKALYAN†∗ and YASHAR TARVERDI†∗∗
† Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre, Curtin Business School, Curtin University, Australia.
ABSTRACT: This paper investigates whether female political representation in national
parliaments influences climate change policy outcomes. Based on data from a large sam-
ple of countries, we demonstrate that female representation leads countries to adopt more
stringent climate change policies. We exploit a combination of full and partial identification
approaches to suggest that this relationship is likely to be causal. Moreover, we show that
through its effect on the stringency of climate change policies, the representation of females
in parliament results in lower carbon dioxide emissions. Female political representation
may be an underutilized tool for addressing climate change.
JEL classification: D70, J16, Q54, Q58.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Climate change is a serious threat, and it demands prompt policy response (Stern, 2008).
Political commitment to address the issue is critical, yet sources of large differences in such
commitments across countries are not fully uncovered. This paper focuses on the relevance
of political identity, and in particular, the gender of politicians. We ask whether represen-
tation of females in political decision-making contributes to climate change policy action
around the world.
That politician’s gender identity may have implications for policy outcomes has been
established in the literature. Studies have shown that female political representation con-
tributes to significant changes in domestic and international policies including higher spend-
ing on health (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Mavisakalyan, 2014) and education (Svaleryd,
2009; Clots-Figueras, 2012), more laws and expenditures relevant to female needs (Chat-
topadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011), higher disbursements of foreign aid (Hicks
et al., 2015, 2016). Furthermore, female politicians have been associated with outcomes such
as better quality of institutions (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001) and higher rates of
economic growth (Jayasuriya and Burke, 2013). While the existing studies on the determi-
nants of climate change policies across countries have highlighted the relevance of coun-
tries’ formal and informal institutions (Fredriksson and Neumayer, 2013; Fredriksson and
Wollscheid, 2015; Ang and Fredriksson, 2017; Mavisakalyan et al., 2018), to the best of our
knowledge the role of politicians’ identity has not received dedicated attention in this liter-
ature.
Gender differences in attitudes towards climate change identified in the general public
suggest that females have greater awareness and concern about climate change than males
do (McCright, 2010; McCright and Dunlap, 2011). Based on theories of gender socialisation,
these differences can be linked to differences in values and social expectations conferred
through socialization whereby cooperation and carefulness - values relevant for climate
change action - are more emphasized in females than in males (Gilligan, 1982; Beutel and
Marini, 1995). Gender differences in climate change concern can also be linked to differ-
ences in social roles performed in the society with production of climate change seen to be
more closely linked to activities performed by males than females (Spitzner, 2009). Further-
more, consequences of climate change are likely to be gender-differentiated as well, with
females more disproportionately bearing the costs of climate change due to their ’gendered
labour and care roles and social status’ (Seager et al., 2016, p.13).
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In ‘citizen candidates’ models, in the absence of complete political commitment, politi-
cians implement policies consistent with their preferences (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996;
Besley and Coate, 1997). However, it is unclear whether we should expect to observe gen-
der differences in preferences of politicians similar to those observed in the general public.
Indeed, it is possible that females who pursue leadership roles in a predominantly male en-
vironment are similar to males (Adams and Funk, 2012). Consistent with this proposition,
Sundstrom and McCright (2014) do not find robust evidence for gender differences in envi-
ronmental concerns among Swedish parliamentarians although such gender differences are
observed in the general public in Sweden. In the context of the US, however, Fredriksson and
Wang (2011) find that female parliamentarians in the House of Representatives have more
pro-environmental views compared to their male counterparts. Building on these observa-
tions, our study evaluates the implications of female representation in politics for climate
change policies adopted by countries around the world.
From an econometric perspective, we are confronted with a problem of omitted variables:
adoption of climate change policies and election of females to parliament may both be the
product of underlying characteristics of countries we do not observe. We employ two key
strategies to ascertain that our estimates are not driven by confounding factors. First, we use
an instrumental variable based on countries’ history of female political empowerment and
estimate a 2SLS model. Second, we use a partial identification approach proposed by Oster
(2016). The main idea of this approach is to study how large would the amount of selection
on unobservables need to be, relative to the amount of selection on observables, to explain
away the entire casual effect of female representation.
Based on a large sample of countries, we document a robust positive association between
female representation in a country’s parliament and the stringency of its climate change
policies. The impact we identify is statistically significant and economically meaningful. As
an illustration, our 2SLS estimation results imply that lifting the female representation in
Bahrain, a country where females comprised just over 2% of parliamentarians in the study
period, to the level of Denmark, a country with over 37% female representation, could lead
to a 6-fold increase in the stringency of the country’s climate change policies (in practice
Denmark’s climate change policies are around 8 times as stringent as Bahrain’s). In extended
results, we further demonstrate that through its effects on the stringency of climate change
policies, female parliamentary representation results in lower carbon dioxide emissions.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the data
used in the study. This is followed by a discussion of our empirical approach and the results
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of baseline analysis in section 3. In section 4 we test the sensitivity of the results to the choice
of control and dependent variables, and functional form, while section 5 is dedicated to ad-
dressing the issue of endogeneity employing instrumental variable and partial identification
approaches. We extend the analysis to study the implications of female representation for
carbon dioxide emissions in section 6. The final section concludes.
2. DATA
We assemble a dataset for a sample of up to 91 countries based on various sources. Table
1 specifies the sources and presents summary statistics for the variables used in the baseline
analysis.
Our measure of climate change policies is Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index
(CLIMI) derived by Steves et al. (2011) based on the 2005-2010 annual national communi-
cations to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and
used in other published studies (e.g., Fredriksson and Neumayer, 2013, 2016). CLIMI mea-
sures the climate change mitigation policies adopted by countries. It is based on 12 com-
ponents grouped into four key policy areas, with weights used to reflect the contribution of
each of the components and areas to climate change mitigation: (i) international coopera-
tion (0.1) [Kyoto ratification (0.5), Joint Implementation or Clean Development Mechanism
host (0.5)]; (ii) domestic climate framework (0.4) [cross-sectoral climate change legislation
(0.33), carbon emissions target (0.33), dedicated climate change institution (0.33)]; (iii) sig-
nificant sectoral fiscal or regulatory measures or targets (0.4) [energy supplies/renewables
(0.3), transport (0.13), buildings (0.07), agriculture (0.13), forestry (0.17), industry (0.2)]; and
(iv) additional cross-sectoral fiscal or regulatory measures (0.1) [cross-sectoral policy mea-
sures (1)]. CLIMI ranges from 0 and 1, with higher values representing stricter policies. The
average CLIMI score in the sample is 0.350. Tonga has the lowest CLIMI score in the sample
at 0.011, while the UK has the highest score at 0.801.
[Table 1 about here.]
To capture the representation of females in politics we use the number of seats held by
female members in single or lower chambers of national parliaments, expressed as a per-
centage of all occupied seats (Female in Parliament). Since CLIMI is measured based on
information collected over the period 2005-2010, this and other time-variant variables in our
analysis are averaged over this time period. The proportion of females in parliament in the
sample averages at 19.25% (ranging from 0 to 52.55%). Figure 1 plots CLIMI against Female
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in Parliament revealing a strong positive relationship: countries with higher proportion of
females in parliament have considerably more stringent climate change policies.
[Figure 1 about here.]
To substantiate on this relationship, our baseline analysis controls for several important
characteristics of countries as highlighted in previous studies on the determinants of cli-
mate change policies. Following Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013, 2016), we control for
countries’ GDP per capita and openness (defined as imports plus exports divided by GDP).
While the demand for climate change policies is expected to increase with GDP per capita,
the expected effect of countries’ openness on the stringency of climate change policies is
ambiguous. As Neumayer (2002) points out, openness may contribute to cooperation on
environmental problems, however it may also hamper it if exporting countries’ interests are
threatened. Following Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013), we additionally control for coun-
tries’ per capita carbon emissions (CO2 emissions per capita) - a variable that ’reflects the
amount at stake for CO2 emitters and thus their lobbying incentives’ (p. 14).1
The literature has highlighted the role of institutions in determining countries’ commit-
ments to address climate change. Countries’ political regime is one important factor, with
democracies promoting the enactment of environmental regulations more than autocracies
do (e.g., Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Farzin and Bond, 2006). Our analysis includes mea-
sures of countries’ political regimes based on Polity IV data set (Marshall et al., 2016). The
polity score captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). We convert this into three regime
categories, distinguishing between autocracies (-10 to -6), democracies (+6 to +10), and other
regime types (Marshall et al., 2016). In our sample, 64% of the countries are democracies
while 12% are autocracies (the remaining 24% have other political regimes).
Legal heritage of countries has been identified as a determinant of a broad range of its
legal rules, regulations, and a number of other outcomes (La Porta et al., 2008). There is also
evidence that it affects climate change policy outcomes across countries (Fredriksson and
Wollscheid, 2015; Ang and Fredriksson, 2017). Legal origins are usually divided into two
main groups: English common law and civil law; the later has four sub-strands: French,
German, Scandinavian, and Socialist legal traditions (La Porta et al., 1998, 2008). Our analy-
sis includes controls for these legal origins. Around 40% of the countries in the sample have
French legal origin. Socialist legal origin underlies almost 31% of the countries, followed
1The results are not sensitive to dropping this variable from the analysis.
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by English legal origin shared by nearly 19% of countries. German and Scandinavian legal
origin groups are small: each of these groups comprises only 5% of countries in the sample.
3. BASELINE RESULTS
To evaluate the baseline effect of the proportion of females in parliament on climate change
policy of country i, we estimate the following model using ordinary least squares (OLS):
CLIMIi = αXi + βFemParliamenti + εi for all i = 1, ..., N. (1)
where FemParliamenti is the proportion of females in a country’s parliament, Xi is a vector
of controls for economic and institutional characteristics of countries defined in section 2,
and εi is a disturbance term.
The OLS estimates of equation 1 are presented in Table 2. Column (1) presents a parsimo-
nious specification which excludes other controls. Consistent with Figure 1, we estimate a
positive highly significant coefficient on Female in Parliament with a magnitude suggesting
a 0.10 point increase in CLIMI associated with a 10 unit increase in Female in Parliament.
Next, in column (2), we control for countries’ GDP per capita and their openness. Intro-
ducing these controls into the regression leaves the sign and statistical significance of the
coefficient on Female in Parliament unaffected, although the magnitude of the coefficient is
slightly smaller. This is not surprising given the observations on the positive link between
countries’ economic development and socioeconomic status of females (Duflo, 2012). Coun-
tries with higher GDP per capita have more stringent climate change policies as captured
by CLIMI. Openness on the other hand, is negatively associated with CLIMI although this
estimate is not robust to introducing additional controls in subsequent specifications.
Column (3) presents the results with CO2 emissions per capita added to the list of controls.
The coefficient on Female in Parliament is unaffected. CO2 emissions per capita is negatively
correlated with CLIMI. This is consistent with findings in Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013)
and suggests that anti-climate change policy lobbying is successfull in places with large CO2
emissions per capita.
The characteristics of countries’ political regime are added as controls in column (4). Re-
assuringly, the estimated positive significant coefficient on Female in Parliament remains
robust to including these controls although it’s magnitude is reduced - an effect that is con-
sistent with findings on positive association between the level of democracy and female
parliamentary representation (Paxton et al., 2010). We establish that democracies, relative
to other political regimes, have more stringent climate change policies. This is in line with
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other findings in the literature (e.g., Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Farzin and Bond, 2006).
The effect of autocracies on the stringency of climate change policies is indistinguishable
from zero.
Finally, in column (5) we include controls for the legal heritage of countries. We confirm
the positive significant coefficient on female parliamentary representation in this specifi-
cation. A 10 unit increase in the female share of parliament is associated with 0.05 point
increase in CLIMI. This effect persists, in spite of the findings in the literature on the posi-
tive effect of Scandinavian legal origin on female parliamentary representation (Austen and
Mavisakalyan, 2016).
In column (6) we undertake to evaluate whether the results we find might be sensi-
tive to the presence of influential observations. To identify these, we calculate DFbetas
for CLIMI from baseline regression in column (5) and drop those observations for which
|DFbeta|>2/√N (Belsley et al., 1980). The results are remarkably similar to those reported
in column (5) thereby confirming that the positive significant association between female
parliamentary representation and the stringency of climate change policies we find is not
driven by influential observations in the sample.
[Table 2 about here.]
To assess the robustness of the results with regard to collinearity, we refer to Variance
Inflation Factors (VIF) based on the baseline regression in column (5) of Table 2. The VIFs
of the control variables reported in Table 3 do not reveal serious collinearity problems; all
variables are well below the rule of thumb VIF value of 10 (Marquaridt, 1970; Neter et al.,
1989; Kennedy, 1992).
[Table 3 about here.]
4. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Additional controls. We have established a positive and statistically significant relationship
between female representation in parliament and the stringency of climate change policies
across countries. Yet, the possibility that female representation simply acts as a marker of
unobserved characteristics of countries cannot be ruled out at this stage of the analysis. To
mitigate this possibility, we control for additional variables that could be correlated with the
unexplained component of CLIMI. The results of this exercise are summarised in Table 4. To
allow for comparisons, in column (1) we report the estimation results of the baseline model
(these are identical to those presented in column (5) of Table 2).
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Average years of schooling in the population is one variable potentially correlated with
the unexplained component of CLIMI. Research has documented that the prevalence of
gender discriminatory attitudes around work decreases with education (e.g., Mavisakalyan,
2015). Meanwhile, education is also positively associated with pro-environmental behaviour
(e.g., Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Mavisakalyan et al., 2018). Indeed, we estimate a positive
coefficient on average years of schooling (sourced from Barro and Lee (2013)). It is how-
ever statistically insignificant in this particular estimation, while the estimated coefficient
on Female in Parliament is unchanged (column (2)).
Our baseline regressions control for important institutional features of countries. How-
ever there may be other characteristics of countries’ institutional environment potentially
correlated with both Female in Parliament and CLIMI. Most crucially perhaps, Female in
Parliament may be simply picking up the effect of left-wing orientation in political power,
which has been linked with pro-environmental outcomes (e.g., Neumayer, 2003, 2004). To
address this possibility, we control for the political orientation of the national leader’s party
available from Keefer (2012).2 Countries’ historical experience of democracy is another im-
portant factor that has been linked with outcomes related to both gender equality (Beer,
2009) as well as climate change policies (Fredriksson and Neumayer, 2013). We therefore
additionally control for a measure of democratic capital stock accumulated in years 1800-
2010 that comes from Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013). The results of the model that con-
trols for these additional institutional variables are presented in column (3). The estimated
coefficients on both are statistically insignificant. The estimate on Female in Parliament is
remarkably similar to that from the baseline model.
Another possibility we consider is that countries with preference for female representa-
tion may simply have more policies in general. In the absence of a direct measure for the
number of policies in a country, we consider a proxy limited to a certain domain: business
regulation environments. Doing Business country rankings sourced from the World Bank
(2018) cover 10 areas of business regulations across countries - starting a business, dealing
with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting
minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving
insolvency - and capture both quantity and quality aspects of the rules. Admittedly, this
measure is narrowly focused and does not cover the full range of policies and institutions
that comprise the regulatory environment in a country. It is perhaps to some extent for that
reason, that we estimate an insignificant coefficient on Doing Business ranking (column 4);
2 The source classifies parties as left if their names reveal them to be communist, socialist, or social demo-
cratic or if they are labeled as left-wing (Beck et al., 2001).
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however it has a negative sign suggesting that complexity of the regulatory environment in
this area is negatively correlated with the stringency of climate change policies. We continue
to observe a significant positive coefficient on Female in Parliament, while its magnitude is
smaller compared to the baseline estimate.
The significance of history in determining contemporary outcomes may manifest through
channels other than those hitherto considered. History of colonialism is one possible chan-
nel, having been linked with gender inequality (Mavisakalyan, 2015) as well as with envi-
ronmental outcomes of countries (Marchand, 2012). The results reported in column (5) are
from a model that includes dummies to identify former British and French colonies.3 These
variables are insignificant, and they do not alter the estimated effect of Female in Parliament
on CLIMI.
Next we consider whether our results may be the outcome of omitting important geo-
economic characteristics of countries. We first control for the countries’ natural resource
wealth as measured by the net value of their oil and gas exports taken from Ross and Mah-
davi (2015). The literature has documented a negative link between oil and gas wealth and
female political participation (Ross, 2008; Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi, 2018). Resource pro-
duction, however, also bears important implications for the climate change policies coun-
tries implement given the traditionally strong opposition from the oil and gas industry. We
additionally control for latitude - a variable that has been linked with Western European
influence and quality of institutions (Hall and Jones, 1999) as well as directly capturing im-
portant geographic differences across countries (Rodrik et al., 2004). Column (6) reports the
results of the regression that controls for these variables. We confirm the positive significant
coefficient on Female in Parliament. The estimated coefficient on Oil & Gas net export per
capita, while negative, is statistically insignificant in this specification. We estimate a pos-
itive significance coefficient on Latitude of capital, however it is not robust to subsequent
alterations to the list of controls.
Further, in column (7) we control for small island states (source: World Bank (2016)) and
climate vulnerability (source: Wheeler (2011)) - variables that have been considered in the
literature to account for the demand for climate change policies (Fredriksson and Neumayer,
2013). According to our results, small island states actually have less stringent climate
change policies, however this estimate is not robust to subsequently controlling for other
geographic characteristics of countries. The estimated coefficient on climate vulnerability
3These do not completely overlap with English and French legal origins although they are correlated.
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is insignificant, while we continue to observe positive significant coefficient on Female in
Parliament.
Finally, in the last column of Table 4, we include dummies for continents. After controlling
for important socio-economic, institutional and geographic characteristics of countries, the
only significant effect we estimate is on the dummy for South America: the climate change
policies in the countries of this continent are on average less stringent compared to those in
African countries. The estimated positive effect of Female in Parliament on CLIMI persists
after these characteristics of countries have been accounted for.
[Table 4 about here.]
As another attempt to test the robustness of our central result on the link between Female
in Parliament and CLIMI to the choice of control variables included in the model, we make
further alterations to the list of controls. In Table 5, we report the results of the regressions
with baseline and additional lists of controls where we replace: (i) GDP per capita with the
Human Development Index by the United Nations Development Programme (2018); (ii) av-
erage years of schooling in the total population with the average years of schooling of the
female population World Bank (2016); (iii) the political (left-wing) orientation of national
leader’s party with the orientation of the largest government party (Keefer, 2012); and (iv)
natural resource export per capita with natural resource export as a share of total merchan-
dise export World Bank (2016).
The estimated coefficients on Female in Parliament are identical to those obtained from
the models with initial specifications of baseline and additional controls. There is a highly
significant positive relationship between a country’s Human Development Index and the
stringency of its climate change policies. The estimates on the average years of schooling
of the female population and the left-wing orientation of the largest government party are
insignificant. But we do estimate a significant negative coefficient on the fuel, ores and
metals export as a share of merchandise exports: there is a decline in CLIMI with an increase
in this share.
[Table 5 about here.]
Alternative dependent variables. Our estimates of the relationship between female rep-
resentation in parliament and climate change policies are remarkably robust to the choice
and definition of control variables in the model. Are they also robust to the way we mea-
sure the countries’ climate change policies? As a first attempt at addressing this question,
we consider the four areas of CLIMI - domestic climate framework; sectoral fiscal or reg-
ulatory measures; additional cross-sectoral fiscal or regulatory measures; and international
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cooperation- as separate dependent variables in Table 6. While the first two policy areas
each enter with the weights of 0.4 in the construction of the overall index, the contribution
of the two later policy areas is limited to the weights of 0.1 each. Consistent with this, we
find that the positive significant effect of Female in Parliament on CLIMI might be driven
by its effect on domestic framework and sectoral measures - the coefficients on Female in
Parliament in the models where the measures for these policy areas are used as the depen-
dent variable are positive and significant. The relationship of Female in Parliament with
cross-sectoral measures or with international cooperation is indistinguishable from zero.
[Table 6 about here.]
In addition to looking at individual policy areas of CLIMI, we consider alternative mea-
sures of countries’ environmental policies. A number of such measures exist, with data
spanning several years which result in unbalanced panel datasets. We study these next, in
a panel fixed effects estimation framework which employs Female in Parliament and other
time-variant characteristics of countries as regressors.4
We start with OECD’s Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPS) - a measure that cap-
tures the degree of stringency of 14 environmental policy instruments, primarily related to
climate and air pollution (Botta and Kozluk, 2014). The data is available for the period from
1990-2012, however it is limited to 27 OECD and 6 BRICS countries.5 The results presented
in the first column of Table 7 confirm the positive significant relationship between Female in
Parliament and this measure of environmental policies. Consistent with the baseline results,
we also observe a positive significant relationship between a country’s per capita GDP and
the stringency of its environmental policies, while the effect of per capita CO2 emissions is
negative.
We consider another policy stringency measure - the Climate Policy Index (CPI) devel-
oped by Ku¨nkel et al. (2006). This index measures climate policy performance and draws
on ’quantitative and qualitative information on national climate policies by sector’ for three
time periods: 1992, 1997 and 2005. The data is available for 24 countries only. Due to unavail-
ability of data on females in parliaments across countries in 1992, our analysis is restricted
to the years 1997 and 2005. The estimated coefficient on Female in Parliament is statistically
insignificant, unsurprisingly so, given the sample size (column 2).6 It should also be noted,
4To increase variability over time, Polity IV scores rather than dummy variables to distinguish between
democracies, autocracies and other regimes are employed in this analysis.
5BRICS refers to the association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa.
6Due to lack of variation over the two time periods within the sample of countries considered here, Polity
IV score is dropped from the estimation.
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however, that this analysis precedes that on CLIMI, and changes in climate policies across
a number of countries over time may also explain the differences in the results (Surminski
and Williamson, 2012).
Finally, we draw on data from Germanwatch to utilise the climate policy ingredients of
their Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) as our outcome measures. The index eval-
uates the climate protection performance of 58 countries that are, together, responsible for
more than 90 percent of global energy-related CO2 emissions (Burck et al., 2014). The cli-
mate policy components of the overall index are based on assessments by country experts
on the extent and quality of each country’s commitment to climate policies and regulations.
There are particularly sharp differences in the measurement criteria used in the construction
of these policy ingredients of CCPI and CLIMI, with the correlation coefficient between the
overall policy ingredient and CLIMI of 0.19 (Surminski and Williamson, 2012). Data is avail-
able for national and international policies from year 2007 onwards, however our analysis
is restricted to the period up to 2014 since no data on per capita CO2 emissions utilised in
the model is available from then on. The results using these policy measures as dependent
variables are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 7. Female in Parliament is positively
significantly correlated with the international policy ingredient of CCPI, however, the esti-
mated coefficient of Female in Parliament in the regressions of the national policy ingredient
of the index is insignificant.
[Table 7 about here.]
Non-parametric analysis. It can be argued that the OLS method imposes some restrictive
assumptions on the model specification. Here we relax two of these assumptions; namely
assumptions regarding the normal distribution of residuals and the functional form relating
the main independent variable to CLIMI.
First, we re-examine the relationship between Female in Parliament and CLIMI, relaxing
the assumption on normally distributed residuals (i.e. εi). We do so by estimating the model
with quantile regression method. By doing that, we also test the robustness of the results
against extreme values of our dependent variable. In quantile regression, the sample is di-
vided into quantiles based on the distribution of dependent variable and therefore the main
model (i.e. equation 1) becomes:
QCLIMI (δ | Xi, FemParliamenti) = β1,δXi + β2,δFemParliamenti + µi (2)
for all i = 1, ..., N.
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In equation 2, as an arbitrary combination, δ can be 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 quantiles. The relevant
results are reported in Table 8. The results corresponding to the first quantile, 0.25, suggest
that the effect is not present; however, when we move to the centre of distribution, 0.5 quan-
tile, the effect of Female in Parliament is significant. Results for the last qunatile, 0.75, show
significant effect, although with slightly smaller magnitude.
[Table 8 about here.]
We further explore the relationship between Female in Parliament and the stringency of
climate change policies across countries when some of the functional form assumptions are
relaxed. The results we have documented so far are based on the assumption of a linear func-
tion relating FemParliamenti to CLIMI. Relaxing this functional form assumption means the
main model in equation 1, now changes to:
CLIMIi = θXi + f (FemParliamenti) + υi for all i = 1, ..., N. (3)
In comparison to equation 1, equation 3 is more flexible as f (.) can accommodate different
functional forms. We allow functional form to be different for every point of FemParliamenti
and estimate the model using Gaussian Kernel. Figure 2 illustrates the estimates of f (.) and
as shown, the effect is always positive and within the confidence intervals. 7
[Figure 2 about here.]
5. ADDRESSING ENDOGENEITY
Employing an instrument. The previous sections have established a rather robust statisti-
cally significant positive relationship between female representation in parliament and the
stringency of climate change policies across countries. However, whether this finding can be
given a causal interpretation can be questioned because of unobserved heterogeneity: places
that are different for a variety of unobserved reasons will differ in their political represen-
tation of females as well as in their climate change policy outcomes. In section 4, we made
an attempt to mitigate the problem of unobserved heterogeneity by adding proxy variables
that could be correlated with the unexplained component of CLIMI, however obviously, un-
observed heterogeneity can never be fully accounted for. A conventional way to deal with
this problem is to use an instrumental variable, a source of exogenous variation in Female
in Parliament, and estimate a 2SLS model. This is what we undertake to do here.
We exploit the electoral experience of females in society, as proxied by the years since fe-
male suffrage was granted, as an instrument to identify the effect of Female in Parliament.
7In the estimation of the relationship for Figure 2 the baseline control variables (i.e. Xi) are considered in
their linear form. Results are available upon request.
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Sourced from UN Women (2011), this instrument has been used in other identification ap-
proaches applied to different contexts (Grier and Maldonado, 2015; Hicks et al., 2016). The
intuition in doing so is simple: a country’s history of suffrage should be highly relevant for
female exposure to politics, however it is unlikely that it directly affects its contemporary
policy outcomes. As an informal way of testing this, in column (2) of Table 9, we report the
results of a regression of Years since suffrage on CLIMI which excludes Female in Parliament
as a regressor (column (1) presents the OLS estimates of the effect of Female in Parliament
on CLIMI; these are identical to those presented in column (5) of Table 2.). The coefficient on
Years since suffrage is positive and significant, however it turns insignificant once Female
in Parliament is controlled for in column (3) suggesting that the effect of our instrument on
the dependent variable is likely to operate through its effect on the endogenous variable.
The 2SLS estimates of equation 1 are presented in columns (4) and (5) of Table 9. Female
in Parliament is treated as endogenous and modeled as:
FemParliamenti = γXi + ζSu f f ragei +ωi for all i = 1, ..., N. (4)
where Su f f ragei is the number of years since female suffrage was granted in a country, Xi
is a vector of controls for economic and institutional characteristics of countries defined in
section 2, and ωi is a disturbance term.
The first stage estimation results reported in column (4) further support the validity of
our identification strategy: we estimate a highly significant positive association between the
years since suffrage and female parliamentary representation.8 In defense of our identifi-
cation strategy, the statistics for the weak identification test (Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F
statistics) provides no evidence that the instrument we use is weak or irrelevant.
Column (5) presents the corresponding results from the 2nd stage of the 2SLS model.
Not only we confirm the positive significant coefficient on Female in Parliament, the esti-
mated magnitude is larger: a 10 unit increase in Female in Parliament is associated with an
increase of 0.12 in CLIMI. This estimate implies that the 35.5 unit difference in female rep-
resentation between two typical countries with high and low representation, Bahrain and
Denmark, would translate into 6-fold difference in the stringency of climate change policies.
This is a relatively precise estimate, given around 8-fold difference in the actual stringency
of climate change policies between the two countries. In comparison, corresponding OLS
estimate from the most extensive parametric model suggests a tangible (over 2-fold) effect of
8We additionally explored the possible non-linearity in the relationship between Years since suffrage and
Female in Parliament by including a squared-term of Years since Suffrage in the estimation of equation 4. The
estimated coefficient on this term was statistically insignificant. The results are available on request.
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female parliamentary representation on the stringency of climate change policies however
it is much smaller than the actual gap in the stringency of climate change policies between
the two countries.
[Table 9 about here.]
An IV estimation can be potentially more convincing in a dataset that varies over time.
Since this is not feasible for CLIMI, a cross-sectional measure, we employ EPS, the measure
of environmental policy stringency from OECD (2016) introduced earlier, in a 2SLS panel
fixed effects regression. The results are reported in Table 10. The baseline OLS results are
reported in column (1) (these are identical to those reported in column (1) of Table 7). We
confirm the significant explanatory power of Years since suffrage in explaining Female in
Parliament in the first stage results in column (2). The statistically significant relationship
between Female in Parliament and EPS persists in the second stage.
[Table 10 about here.]
Partial identification. Our instrumental variable strategy, while convincing at face value,
would be questionable if there is the possibility that the history of suffrage affects climate
change policy outcomes through mechanisms other than the Female in Parliament. Natu-
rally, it is not possible to control for all possible variables that might be correlated with the
years since suffrage and CLIMI. Here we take an alternative strategy to assess the potential
impact of unobserved heterogeneity: we use a partial identification approach proposed by
Oster (2016) to evaluate how large would the amount of selection on unobservables need to
be, relative to the amount of selection on observables, to explain away the entire causal ef-
fect of Female in Parliament on CLIMI. To do that, we evaluate the bias-adjusted coefficient
derived by Oster (2016):
β∗ ≈ β˜− δ[β˙− β˜]Rmax − R˜
R˜− R˙ (5)
where β˙ and R˙ are the coefficient and the R-squared from estimating the equation 1 where
α = 0 and β˜ and R˜ are the coefficient and R-squared from the regression where α 6= 0, i.e.
other explanatory variables for CLIMI, in addition to Female in Parliament, are included.
δ denotes the relative importance of observable relative to unobservable variables in gen-
erating bias; Rmax is the R-squared from a hypothetical regression of CLIMI on all observ-
able and unobservable variables. Both of these measures are unknown. Hence, Oster (2016)
proposes a bounding approach: the estimated effect of Female in parliament should range
from β˜ to β∗ estimated under an assumption of δ = 1, and given values of Rmax ∈ [R˜, 1].
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We apply two assumptions on the value of Rmax: (i) Rmax = 0.90, i.e. that the measurement
error in CLIMI accounts for 10% of the variation therein; (ii) Rmax = min{1.3R˜, 1} - the rule
of thumb proposed by Oster (2016).
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 11. In columns (2) and (4) we report the
coefficient bounds [β˜, β∗] for models with baseline and comprehensive lists of controls (cor-
responding to those reported in column (5) of Table 2 and column (8) of Table 4). β˜ comes
from the specifications controlling for all baseline/comprehensive observables. β∗ is eval-
uated using equation (5) by setting δ = 1 and applying the two assumptions on the value
of Rmax. The identified sets, [β˜, β∗] exclude zeros in all cases - a finding that suggests that
at least some of the estimated effect of Female in Parliament might be causal. Furthermore,
in columns (1) and (3) we observe that in all cases δ > 1, i.e. that the unobservables would
have to be more important than the observables in explaining CLIMI; this finding provides
further support to the validity of our results.
[Table 11 about here.]
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR EMISSIONS
Female parliamentary representation appears to be a significant factor in explaining cli-
mate change policies across countries. Here we ask whether this finding has implications
for actual outcomes: do the policy changes associated with female representation result in
lower carbon dioxide emissions? To explore these relationships, we estimate the equations
1 and 4 jointly with the following equation determining carbon dioxide emissions, using
3SLS:
CO2i = ηCi + µDi + λCLIMIi + ιi for all i = 1, ..., N. (6)
where CO2i is the per capita carbon emissions of a country, Ci is a sub-set of control vari-
ables included in Xi in equation 1. In particular, for identification purposes, the measures
of countries’ legal origins are included in Xi but not in Ci, i.e. we assume that legal origins
might affect CO2 emissions only through their effect on countries’ environmental policies.
Another exclusion restriction from the model is that Female in Parliament does not affect
CO2 emissions once CLIMI is taken into account. Similar approach has been adopted in
other studies that focus on a single potential transmission mechanism at a time (e.g., Syl-
wester, 2000; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Mavisakalyan, 2011). Di contains two additional
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determinants of CO2 that are excluded from equations 1 and 4: a squared term of GDP per
capita and population density; ιi is a disturbance term.
The results of estimating equations 1, 4 and 6 simultaneously using 3SLS are summarised
in Table 12. The coefficients of interest are β in equation 1 and λ in equation 6: is female
representation in parliament associated with more stringent climate change policies, and do
climate change policies lower carbon dioxide emissions at the same time? Our response
to both questions is affirmative. Based on the results reported in columns (2) and (3), a 10
unit increase in female representation, through its effect on the stringency of climate change
policies, results in 0.24 (=0.018*13.084) metric tones decrease of carbon dioxide emissions
per capita.
[Table 12 about here.]
7. CONCLUSION
The lack of political commitment to address climate change around the world warrants
an inquiry into underlying sources. In this paper, we have asked whether the lack of female
political representation may be one such source. Our results confirm that this is the case: fe-
male representation in national parliaments leads to more stringent climate change policies
across countries, and by doing so, it results in lower carbon dioxide emissions.
The results of this study have important policy implications. They suggest that manipula-
tion of the gender identity of politicians might yield changes in climate change actions coun-
tries are opting for. Moreover, various international campaigns to address climate change
may succeed more in places where more females are represented in political power. Various
forms of affirmative action to increase female representation in politics have been increas-
ingly introduced by countries in recent years. Our results suggest that these are likely to
result in increase in countries’ commitments to address climate change.
A number of interesting questions remain to be addressed in future research. If the sources
of gender differences in climate change concerns are related to differences in social and eco-
nomic positions of females and males in the society, will these differences persist as the
position of females changes? We established that gender identity of politicians matters for
climate change action but other dimensions of identity such as age and ethnicity as well as
intersectionality across various dimensions may play a role as well. Exploring the links be-
tween various dimensions of politicians’ identity and climate change policy-making appears
to be a direction with high potential returns to further analysis.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variables Source Mean Std.Dev.
CLIMI Steves et al. (2011) 0.350 0.235
Female in Parliament (%) World Bank (2016) 19.250 11.008
GDP per capita (log)† World Bank (2016) 9.386 1.189
Openness World Bank (2016) 0.885 0.509
CO2 emissions per capita World Bank (2016) 5.830 5.327
Democracy Marshall et al. (2016) 0.637 0.483
Autocracy Marshall et al. (2016) 0.121 0.328
Other regime Marshall et al. (2016) 0.242 0.431
English legal origin La Porta et al. (1998) 0.187 0.392
French legal origin La Porta et al. (1998) 0.396 0.492
German legal origin La Porta et al. (1998) 0.055 0.229
Scandinavian legal origin La Porta et al. (1998) 0.055 0.229
Socialist legal origin La Porta et al. (1998) 0.308 0.464
N 91
Note.—Variables are defined in section 2. † PPP (constant 2011 interna-
tional $).
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Table 2: Baseline OLS regressions
All All All All All No outliers
Control variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female in Parliament (%) 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP per capita (log)† 0.125*** 0.188*** 0.147*** 0.138*** 0.136***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024)
Openness -0.046* -0.047* -0.012 -0.012 0.016
(0.027) (0.024) (0.032) (0.033) (0.025)
CO2 emissions per capita -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Democracy 0.166*** 0.159*** 0.177***
(0.040) (0.038) (0.037)
Autocracy 0.050 0.043 0.074
(0.058) (0.058) (0.056)
English legal origin -0.056 -0.073
(0.072) (0.072)
French legal origin -0.083 -0.091
(0.063) (0.063)
German legal origin 0.071 0.054
(0.056) (0.055)
Socialist legal origin -0.044 -0.075
(0.067) (0.066)
Constant 0.161*** -0.920*** -1.393*** -1.150*** -0.999*** -0.978***
(0.045) (0.116) (0.138) (0.164) (0.215) (0.221)
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.559 0.638 0.701 0.710 0.730
N 91 91 91 91 91 87
Note.— Dependent variable is CLIMI. Columns (1)-(5) report the results based on the full sample.
Column (6) reports the results in a sample where outliers are removed; these are identified by
predicting DFbetas for Female in Parliament (%) from the full sample regression and then dropping
those observations for which |DFbeta|>2/√N. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. † PPP (constant 2011 international $).
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Table 3: Variance Inflation Factors: Baseline regression
Variables VIF 1/VIF
Female in Parliament (%) 1.390 0.718
GDP per capita (log)† 3.490 0.286
Openness 1.260 0.794
CO2 emissions per capita 3.490 0.286
Democracy 1.960 0.511
Autocracy 1.730 0.577
English legal origin 5.210 0.153
French legal origin 6.530 0.156
German legal origin 2.070 0.484
Socialist legal origin 6.430 0.156
Note.— † PPP (constant 2011 international
$).
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Table 4: OLS regressions with additional controls
Control variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female in Parliament (%) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003* 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Average years of schooling† 0.016 0.026** 0.023** 0.022* 0.021* 0.022** 0.042***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Left government -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.024 -0.028 -0.056
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Stock of democracy 0.128 0.113 0.099 0.071 0.082 0.173*
(0.087) (0.084) (0.095) (0.087) (0.089) (0.087)
Doing Business ranking -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
British colony -0.044 -0.065 -0.057 -0.016
(0.104) (0.089) (0.090) (0.085)
French colony -0.036 -0.047 -0.037 -0.029
(0.048) (0.046) (0.045) (0.051)
Oil & Gas net export per capita (1000 US$) -0.011 -0.014* -0.013*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Latitude of capital 0.234** 0.194 -0.101
(0.111) (0.118) (0.103)
Small island -0.085* -0.042
(0.043) (0.058)
Climate vulnerability 0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Asia -0.002
(0.063)
Europe 0.045
(0.090)
North America -0.107
(0.084)
Oceania -0.142
(0.095)
South America -0.193**
(0.082)
Constant -0.999*** -0.970*** -0.784*** -0.539* -0.522* -0.593** -0.635** -0.538
(0.215) (0.261) (0.241) (0.283) (0.292) (0.278) (0.306) (0.339)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.710 0.724 0.747 0.750 0.746 0.761 0.758 0.789
N 91 80 77 77 77 77 77 77
Note.— Dependent variable is CLIMI. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. † Total population of
15 years old or above.
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Table 5: OLS regrssions with alternative controls
Control variables (1) (2)
Female in Parliament (%) 0.005*** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001)
Human Development Index 0.970*** 0.837**
(0.146) (0.361)
Openness 0.003 0.003
(0.037) (0.033)
CO2 emissions per capita -0.010*** -0.013**
(0.004) (0.005)
Democracy 0.164*** 0.088*
(0.036) (0.048)
Autocracy 0.073 0.218***
(0.054) (0.064)
English legal origin -0.081 -0.084
(0.073) (0.114)
French legal origin -0.065 -0.034
(0.061) (0.067)
German legal origin 0.055 -0.064
(0.052) (0.062)
Socialist legal origin -0.095 -0.119
(0.062) (0.076)
Average years of schooling, females† 0.019
(0.013)
Left largest government party -0.029
(0.034)
Stock of democracy 0.200**
(0.086)
Doing Business ranking -0.000
(0.001)
British colony -0.009
(0.085)
French colony -0.036
(0.050)
Fuel, ores and metals export (% of merchandise exports) -0.002***
(0.001)
Latitude of capital -0.183
(0.126)
Small island 0.000
(0.052)
Climate vulnerability -0.003
(0.003)
Asia -0.092
(0.072)
Europe -0.088
(0.104)
North America -0.267**
(0.104)
Oceania -0.292**
(0.109)
South America -0.251***
(0.091)
Constant -0.427*** -0.225
(0.119) (0.215)
Baseline controls Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.722 0.812
N 91 74
Note.— Dependent variable is CLIMI. Robust standard errors in parentheses.***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. † Total population of 15 years old or above.
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Table 6: OLS regressions with separate policy areas of CLIMI as depedent variables
Domestic framework Sectoral measures Cross-sectoral measures International cooperation
Control variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female in Parliament (%) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.605 0.624 0.412 0.074
N 91 91 91 91
Note.— Dependent variables are the separate policy areas of CLIMI. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 7: OLS panel fixed effects regressions with alternative dependent vari-
ables
EPS CPI CCPI- CCPI-
national policy international policy
Control variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female in Parliament (%) 0.052*** 0.009 -0.004 0.005**
(0.012) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
GDP per capita (log)† 1.706*** -0.172 0.306* 0.165
(0.588) (0.413) (0.174) (0.176)
Openness 0.009 -0.003 0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Polity IV score -0.018 0.015** 0.028***
(0.019) (0.006) (0.005)
CO2 emissions per capita -0.205** 0.043 0.004 0.020
(0.084) (0.035) (0.018) (0.013)
Constant -15.408*** 3.922 -2.679 -1.514
(5.273) (4.142) (1.706) (1.761)
Adjusted R2 0.505 -0.011 0.010 0.046
N 526 48 433 433
Countries 33 24 55 55
Note.— Dependent variables are: Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPS) (OECD,
2016) in column 1; Climate Policy Index (CPI) from Ku¨nkel et al. (2006) in column (2),
national and international policy components of Germanwatch’s Climate Change Perfor-
mance Index (CCPI) in columns (3) and (4). Robust standard errors in parentheses.***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. † PPP (constant 2011 international $).
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Table 8: Quantile regressions
Control variables Quantiles
0.25 0.5 0.75
(1) (2) (3)
Female in Parliament (%) 0.004 0.005*** 0.004*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes
N 91
Note.—Dependent variable is CLIMI. Bootstrapped (50
replications) standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: 2SLS regression
Control variables OLS 2SLS
1stStage 2ndStage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female in Parliament (%) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Years since suffrage 0.002*** 0.001 0.190***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.053)
GDP per capita (log)† 0.138*** 0.116*** 0.127*** -2.666 0.147***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (1.796) (0.026)
Openness -0.012 0.004 -0.006 2.433 -0.025
(0.033) (0.041) (0.034) (2.327) (0.024)
CO2 emissions per capita -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.015*** 0.439 -0.018***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.324) (0.005)
Democracy 0.159*** 0.170*** 0.151*** 3.796 0.122***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (2.486) (0.044)
Autocracy 0.043 0.095 0.073 5.034 0.035
(0.058) (0.063) (0.061) (3.675) (0.058)
English legal origin -0.056 -0.132** -0.033 -20.871*** 0.125
(0.072) (0.062) (0.069) (3.855) (0.132)
French legal origin -0.083 -0.133** -0.062 -14.616*** 0.048
(0.063) (0.057) (0.060) (3.398) (0.096)
German legal origin 0.071 0.042 0.102* -12.298*** 0.196*
(0.056) (0.052) (0.061) (4.628) (0.105)
Socialist legal origin -0.044 -0.170*** -0.059 -24.178*** 0.124
(0.067) (0.054) (0.066) (3.290) (0.112)
Constant -0.999*** -0.837*** -1.018*** 39.259** -1.316***
(0.215) (0.202) (0.209) (16.840) (0.292)
Adjusted R2 0.710 0.705 0.738 0.649
Partial R2 0.101
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F statistics†† 12.72
N 91 89 88 88 88
Note.—Dependent variable is CLIMI. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.˙ † PPP (constant 2011 international $). †† The Ho is that the first stage equation is weakly identified.
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Table 10: 2SLS panel fixed effects regression
Control variables OLS 2SLS
1stStage 2ndStage
(1) (2) (3)
Female in Parliament (%) 0.052*** 0.159***
(0.012) (0.033)
Years since suffrage 0.745***
(0.113)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.505 0.225
Partial R2 0.409
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F statistics† 43.56
Countries 33 30 30
Note.—Dependent variable is Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPS)
(OECD, 2016). The list of baseline controls is identical to those included in
Table 7. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
†The Ho is that the first stage equation is weakly identified.
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Table 11: Test of omitted variable bias
Specification δRmax=0.90
[
β˜, β∗(Rmax=0.90,δ=1)
]
δRmax=min{1.3R˜,1}
[
β˜, β∗
(Rmax=min{1.3R˜,1},δ=1)
]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BASELINE CONTROL 2.07 [0.003, 0.005] 1.725 [0.002, 0.005]
COMPREHENSIVE CONTROLS 3.288 [0.002, 0.003] 1.132 [0.0004, 0.003]
Note.— δ indicates the value of proportional selection of unobservables to observable assuming the maximum
value of theoretical R2 is Rmax. The coefficient bounds are calculated assuming the unobservables are as important
as the observable in explaining the outcome variable (i.e. δ = 1).
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Table 12: 3SLS regressions
Female in Parliament (%) CLIMI CO2 emissions per capita
Control variables (1) (2) (3)
Female in Parliament (%) 0.018***
(0.004)
CLIMI -13.084***
(3.660)
Years since suffrage 0.155**
(0.062)
Other baseline controls† Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.285 0.514 0.781
N 88 88 88
Note.— Dependent variables are: Female in Parliament (%) in column 1; CLIMI in column (2);
and CO2 emissions per capita in column (3). † The lists of other controls included in models
(1) and (2) are identical to those included in 2SLS estimations reported in columns (4) and (5)
of Table 9. The list of other controls in model (3) includes controls for GDP per capite squared-
term and population density in addition to the controls reported in column (5) of Table 9 but
with the exception of Female in Parliament, COs emissions per capita and dummies for legal
origin. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The overall adjusted
adjusted R2 for the system is 0.984. The F-test of joint significance of all excluded variables in the
system is 71.61.
